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Editorial
With the seasonal festivities
just behind the corner it’s
time to get started on New
Year’s resolutions. Forget
about the gym, correcting all
the mistakes on Wikipedia or
re-reading 1984, and make
“Contribute to The Rea-
soner” top of your list!
Why should you consider
doing this? Well, because
not everything worth reading
can go through the lengthy
and costly process of aca-
demic writing. Sometimes
good ideas need to be jotted
down quickly, otherwise they will be lost, possibly forever! The
Reasoner Speculates is the place for ideas that are too good to
be snowed under the next hundred of posts on facebook or twit-
ter, but which aren’t quite fully baked for a paper. I discussed
this (partly baked!) idea in my May 2017 editorial, but bear
with me if I repeat once more the key message by I.J. Good
“It is often better to be stimulating and wrong than boring and
right”.
News are of course always welcome. You can report on work-
shops, seminars, summer/winter schools and all sorts of rea-
soning activities that you find exciting. Not only the reasoning
community will be updated on your field – your funding body
will be delighted to read about how you used their money!
If you are running an important project, then you may also con-
sider reporting regularly about it on the Dissemination Corner.
We are delighted to host updates about the ERC Consolidator
Grant the Logic of Conceivability and we hope to host many
more.
Two sections evolved into being the most recognisable features
of The Reasoner for the past decade. The first is An Inter-
view with . . . in which guest editors introduce the background
and work of a reasoner, who is then asked to share their in-
sights with the readers. Topics of interest span the history and
foundations of reasoning as well as its applications, from arti-
ficial intelligence to medicine to economic theory – reasoners
can be found in all playgrounds. The second very recognis-
able feature of our gazette is What’s hot in . . .. A number
columnists have recently joined The Reasoner. In addition to
the columns on Evidence-Based medicine and Uncertain Rea-
soning which have been running for years, recent regular addi-
tions include (Formal) Argumentation Theory, Medieval Rea-
soning and Philosophy & Economics. The Reasoner constantly
welcomes proposals for new interviews, reviews and columns
– see the submit page on the website for more details.
Hykel Hosni
Universita` degli Studi di Milano
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The Reasoner Speculates
Alice is not impressed by the Sorities Paradox
Bob, in order to impress Alice, decides to amuse her with the
Sorities Paradox. The conversation goes like this:
Bob: See that tree over there. It’s far away right?
Alice: Sure.
Bob: But if I was standing right in front of it it would not be
far away, it would be near.
Alice: For sure.
Bob: And from points in between the tree may be far or near.
Alice: Sounds reasonable.
Bob: And if you’re at some point in between which is far
from the tree and you move 1mm forward towards the tree then
clearly you’ll still be far from the tree.
Alice: Hmm, I guess.
At this point Bob plays his trump card pointing out that start-
ing where they are and moving 1mm at a time towards the tree
and the tree will remain ‘far’ throughout, so will still be ‘far’
even when they arrive right next to the tree. Unfortunately Al-
ice doesn’t seem quite as impressed as Bob hoped. The result-
ing conversation goes like this.
Alice: Well obviously then you can’t be right, it must
change from far to near at some point. Unfortunately we don’t
have time to actually do your experiment to find out where it is
but we can if we try it another way. Let’s walk half way. If I
still think it’s far then this point must be between that point and
the tree. On the other hand if I think it is then near we know
the point must be between our start and this mid-point. So now
we’ve trapped the point in an interval half what we started with.
Repeating it we can go down to a quarter of the original dis-
tance, and so on. Since the tree is at most 100m away we will
determine this point in about log2(10, 000) ≤ 14 steps, which
we do have time for.
Bob: Oh.
When they do attempt this experiment there are now two pos-
sibilities. The first is that they capture the point.
Alice: OK, so I was wrong not to object to your assertion
And if you’re at some point in between which is far from the
tree and you move 1mm forward towards the tree then clearly
you’ll still be far from the tree at the time, we now see it is is
false.
The other possibility is that at some point Alice simply isn’t
able to say if the tree is far away or not.
Alice: OK, so I was wrong not to object to your assertion
And if you’re at some point in between which is far from the
tree and you move 1mm forward towards the tree then clearly
you’ll still be far from the tree at the time. For how could I agree
to it if in general I cannot even tell if a point is far or near to the
tree? I was clearly wrong to go along with this assumption of
yours.
Bob: So you don’t think there’s a paradox here?
Alice: No.
Bob to himself: Don’t know why I ever wanted to impress
her in the first place.
Jeff Paris
News
Ampliative Reasoning in the Sciences - 5th Work-
shop on Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality, May
18–19
The workshop on Ampliative Reasoning in the Sciences (May
18-19, 2017, Ghent) is the 5th in the series on Logic, Reasoning
and Rationality, organized by the scientific research network
Logical and Methodological Analysis of Scientific Reasoning
Processes. The network is funded by the Flemish Research
Foundation (FWO). It consists of nine research centers within
Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, and the UK. The
workshop series includes two workshops per year (see here for
more info on the workshop series, the network, and upcoming
events).
The workshop was organized by two partner centers of the
network: the Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science at
Ghent University and the Research Group for Non-Monotonic
Logic and Formal Argumentation at Ruhr-University Bochum.
The aim of the workshop was to bring together scholars in-
vestigating ampliative reasoning in the sciences, working in
different philosophical sub-domains. In particular, the focus
was on three central perspectives on this topic: the formal per-
spective (philosophical logic, probability theory), the method-
ological perspective (philosophy of science, epistemology) and
the historical perspective (integrated history & philosophy of
science). Three keynote speakers each addressed the topic of
ampliative reasoning from one of these three angles. In addi-
tion, there were 17 contributed talks ranging over a variety of
topics from these three perspectives, leading to fruitful cross-
disciplinary discussions.
The first keynote speaker, Chiara Ambrosio (University Col-
lege London), gave a talk covering the historical perspec-
tive. The topic of her talk was “Ampliative reasoning from
an integrated HPS perspective: Some insights from Peirce and
Whewell”. The talk focused on the status of ampliative reason-
ing in 19th century scholarship and, in particular, in the works
of Peirce and Whewell. Ambrosio suggested that the notion of
ampliative reasoning in this time period should be understood
against the backdrop of the reformation of science, character-
ized by its divergence from natural philosophy and by the pro-
cess of specialization. She suggested that ampliative reasoning
played a central role in the understanding of the notion of scien-
tist, by offering a remedy against the fragmentation of science
into particular domains. This was argued for with reference to
Whewell’s influence on Peirce.
The second keynote speaker, Jon Williamson (University of
Kent), gave a talk on the topic “Establishing causal claims in
medicine”, covering the second, methodological, perspective
on ampliative reasoning. Williamson started from an epistemo-
logical thesis, previously developed by Russo and Williamson,
that establishing a causal claim in medicine requires establish-
ing (i) that the putative cause and putative effect are appropri-
ately correlated, and (ii) that there is some underlying mecha-
nism that can account for this correlation. Williamson argued
that even though this thesis conflicts with some approaches
rooted in contemporary evidence-based medicine, it offers a
better explanation of (a) the role of clinical studies in establish-
ing causal claims, and (b) the extrapolation from causal claims
about the source population to causal claims about the target
population. In particular, the thesis accounts for the cases in
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which causal claims can be established even in the absence of
clinical studies, as well as the cases in which evidence from
clinical studies is trumped by the evidence of mechanisms un-
derlying the phenomenon in question.
The third keynote speaker, Ulrike Hahn (Birkbeck—
University of London and LMU Munich), covered the first, for-
mal perspective on ampliative reasoning. In her talk entitled
“Bayesian reasoning for non-statistical contexts” she discussed
normative standards of argument quality in contexts that are
not statistical in nature. Hahn presented a Bayesian framework
for ampliative reasoning, focusing on argument forms that are
in some contexts (though not in others) considered fallacious,
such as the circular argument or petitio principii. She argued
that this probabilistic framework can provide a normative stan-
dard by which to assess the strength of a range of everyday
arguments. The framework can also be used to complement
the argumentation scheme approach in informal argumentation
theory. In the latter approach arguments are evaluated with ref-
erence to critical questions. Answers to such questions are of-









Summer School in Social Epistemology, 28
August–1 September
The Summer School in Social Epistemology, August 28th-
September 1st 2017, a five-day summer school at La Cristalera,
in the Autonomous University of Madrid, brought together re-
searchers from all over the world to explore some views and
debates on recent topics in social epistemology. The Summer
School was organized by the Epistemology and Society Net-
work (EpiSoc), based in the Autonomous University of Madrid,
in collaboration with the Social Epistemology Research Group,
based in the University of Copenhagen. Each day was devoted
to a central topic and included a plenary talk by a keynote
speaker, a pre-read session with prepared comments and pre-
sentations by selected speakers.
The first day was dedicated to What is Social Epistemology
and Epistemic Injustice. The first talk of the session was San-
ford C. Goldberg’s Against Epistemic Partiality in Friendship:
Value-Reflecting reasons. He presented an account on how the
appearance of unwarranted epistemic partiality in friendship
dissipates once we acknowledge a new category of reasons. On
the pre-read session, Chris Kelp commented Goldberg’s Pro-
posed Research Program for Social Epistemology, which was a
thorough and programmatic presentation of the challenges that
Social Epistemology faces. One of the central parts of the dis-
cussion revolved around the question whether there is some-
thing entirely new and unique about this project or whether tra-
ditional epistemology can cover the new challenges, despite its
alleged individualism. The day included presentations about
identity prejudices, epistemic silencing, testimonial injustice
and epistemic inclusion and fruitful reflections on the different
harms that can be done to someone in her capacity as a knower.
Tuesday, 29th was devoted to Trust and Katherine Hawley
was the leading voice. She presented her work on Trust and
Gettier. She carefully pointed out that there is some asymme-
try in our reactions to Gettiered trust and Gettiered distrust. She
suggested that it seems worse to distrust on a fragile basis than
to trust on a fragile basis. The cases she presented supported
the idea that when it comes to trust, as long as it is accurate and
justified, Gettiered scenarios do not worry us as much. Jesu´s
Navarro introduced the discussion on Hawley’s work Trustwor-
thiness. Long story short, according to her view, in order to be
trustworthy, we must ensure that our commitments are matched
by action. The presentations covered a wide variety of topics,
including trust and its relation to epistemic paternalism and au-
thority, instruments, sincerity and blame.
Wednesday the 30th was dedicated to The epistemology of
groups and Berit Brogaard opened the day with a talk on Social
Media and Knowledge degradation. She presented research
on crowd manipulation and group polarization, an interesting
(and potentially worrisome) phenomenon where a group ends
up having a view that is more radical than the one held by the
most radical of its individual members. Her pre-read session
on the topic included some experiments from social psychol-
ogy and was commented by Fernando Broncano-Berrocal who
introduced the discussion session. The day included interest-
ing presentations and debates concerning group epistemology
(from intergroup biases to group polarisation), epistemic prac-
tices and rationality.
The fourth day was Testimony day and Paul Faulkner pre-
sented his account of the phenomenon of Giving the Benefit of
Doubt, where he offered an interesting argument for the view
that it can be rational to give the benefit of the doubt and be-
lieve in the innocence of your friend, even in the face of in-
criminatory evidence. On the pre-read session Jesu´s Vega pre-
sented and opened the discussion concerning Faulkner’s work
in progress On Conversion. The debate was specially hot con-
cerning the limit and scope of the practical engagement of con-
version. Lies, testimonial dogmatism and luck were some of
the topics discussed during the day.
Friday 1st of September was devoted to Disagreement.
Jonathan Matheson gave a stimulating talk on Disagreement
and the Rationality of Religious Belief. He first took up the
question of whether disagreement on religious matters is of a
special or unique kind. His conclusion was that it is not and that
the conciliationist stance that he advocates could also apply to
this type disagreement. His work on Deep Disagreements and
Rational Resolution was commented by Klemens Kappel and
the debate revolved around the question whether a conciliation-
ist position is compatible with the existence of disagreement on
basic epistemic principles and thereby scrutinized the very na-
ture of those principles. Conciliationism, epistemic injustice
and assertion were some of the topics presented and discussed
during the rest of the sessions.
Overall, the event was insightful and called attention to sig-
nificant challenges to social epistemology. It also offered the
opportunity to bring together people, open new spaces for dis-
cussion and engage in high-quality debates concerning the cur-
rent state of Social Epistemology. As a nice corollary, I would
like to point out that all of the topics that Goldberg presented in
his proposed research program on the first day were addressed
throughout the days of the summer school. This might be read
as a sign that social epistemology is a cohesive, flourishing
project.
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